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ABSTRACT  
In recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis from critical infrastructure protection to that 
of resilience. This development reflects the acknowledgment that complete protection can 
never be guaranteed, and that achieving the desired level of protection is not cost-effective 
as a rule in relation to the actual threats. This article reviews the responses of four of the five 
Nordic countries to this challenge, namely Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The article 
analyzes their strategies and conceptual development, highlighting the common trends and 
differences. In so doing, it argues that these countries have a better starting point for the task of 
making their critical infrastructure resilient than most of the EU. This is due to the fact that 
even before the resilience debate emerged, these countries had based their policies on securing 
vital societal functions rather than the individual infrastructures that support these functions. 
The article concludes that some kind of Nordic model can really be identified when it comes to 
approaches towards critical infrastructure resilience. It should also be recognized, however, that 
there has been a fruitful interplay at the conceptual level between the Nordic countries and the 












The notion of the Nordic model is well-known is such fields as national economic and social 
policies that contribute to the welfare state, which combines free market capitalism with rather 
heavy state regulation and re-distribution policies. But is there a Nordic model, compared to 
the rest of the European Union (EU), or the European Commission-sponsored (EC) approaches, 
when it comes to critical infrastructure (CI) resilience in the context of more generic civil 
protection approaches?  
 
Although there are five Nordic countries, this article only analyzes Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden (leaving Iceland aside), suggesting that these four constitute a reasonably 
representative sample of the Nordic region. While only Denmark, Finland and Sweden are EU 
members, Norway is closely connected to the Union through its membership of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), and in practice often follows the same policies as the EU in the field of 
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civil protection. However, fundamentally, in spite of the EU’s efforts to coordinate efforts for 
civil protection and critical infrastructure protection (CIP), especially in such cases when this 
infrastructure can be understood as European Critical Infrastructure (ECI), at the end of the day 
critical infrastructure remains the sole responsibility of the member states. 
 
2. Methodology  
 
The current analysis focuses on the conceptual and programmatic developments of the EU and 
the four Nordic countries respectively, rather than any empirical and sector-specific case 
studies. This comparative approach is applied to several dimensions of the puzzle. First, the 
developments are compared across changes over time, ranging from the early 2000s to the 
contemporary situation, in order to identify general trends. Second, the Nordic countries are 
viewed from the perspective of wider developments in the EU, thereby comparing their 
developments vis-à-vis the EC policies. Third, when reviewing the four Nordic countries, the 
account also explicitly becomes a comparative study of each one. Finally, the review is 
organized in terms of five sub-areas or binary test questions, as illustrated in Table 1.  
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Section 3 provides a rather descriptive review of these five test questions, discussed somewhat 
more analytically in section 4. The results of this comparative exercise are summarized in the 
concluding section 5 and its accompanying Table 2. 
 
3. Comparative review 
 
In accordance with Table 1, each part of this review section starts with more generic notions 
about international or EU approaches, followed by concise reviews of the respective Nordic 
countries’ positions. More emphasis is put on the similarities rather than country-specific 
idiosyncrasies – which obviously reflect each country’s traditions, location, challenges and 
experiences, administrative-political systems, and so on – although some specific differences 
are highlighted. The main sources of evidence are official documents, namely those major 
statements, policy papers, strategies and so forth that should be seen as constitutive of more 
specific and even operative actions. 
 
3.1 Critical infrastructure or vital societal functions?  
 
After 9/11, the concept of CIP became a new catchword in the US [1, 2, 3]. It quickly 
caught on in Europe as well, first through NATO and then within the EU soon thereafter. 
After the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks, the EU debate culminated in 
the development of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(EPCIP) and its corresponding legislation [4]. The EU Directive from 2008 [5] defines 
critical infrastructure as follows: “An asset, system or part thereof located in Member States 
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, 
economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would 
have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those 
functions”.  
 
In 2012 the EPCIP was reviewed by the EC [6], and a degree of self-appraisal is apparent 
in the working document that ensued. The review states that a number of member states 
follow “system-focused national CIP programmes where the end goal is security and 
resilience of systems, which may involve activities across multiple sectors”. While the 
member states referred to in this statement are not identified in the document, it is clear that 
this description can readily be applied to the Nordic countries, including non-EU-member 
Norway. To this end, the Nordic countries were not merely passive adopters of the EU 
approach but, on the contrary, influenced future EU policies with their own approach.  
 
Even before the resilience discourse emerged in the context of critical infrastructure, it was 
clear that the CIP terminology and definitions used by the Nordic countries adhered to their 
own longer-term traditions, and the solutions they had adopted to meet new circumstances. 
In other words, the Nordic CI concept was based on the traditional total defence or civil 
defence systems that were built up during the Cold War.  ‘Total defence’ usually refers to 
the need to take all defence dimensions into account, including military, economic, civil, 
social, and psychological defence. In the Finnish context, for instance, this is usually referred 
to as ‘comprehensive national defence’ today: “The preparedness of Finnish society is 
executed with the principle of comprehensive security, which entails the safeguarding of 
vital functions of society in a joint effort of the authorities, the business sector and 
organisations and citizens”. [7] 
 
By definition, this approach then becomes a more inter-sectoral and more resilience-oriented 
starting point – compared to mere CIP policies – from which to develop current strategies. 
Based in part on this Cold War experience and the constant uncertainty which characterized 
that era, all of the Nordic countries also have well-developed redundancy and storage-based 
systems to secure the supply chain of critical materials and services, such as energy and basic 
public health-related drugs.  
 
In any case, the Nordic countries speak more about critical or vital societal functions than 
mere CI. In Denmark, for instance, its ‘National Risk Profile’ is based on vital societal 
functions. In the 2013 National Risk Profile [8], prepared by the Danish Emergency 
Management Agency (DEMA) and subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, the agency 
refers to activities, commodities, services, and so forth that underpin society’s general ability 
to function. The 2017 version of the National Risk Profile [9] in turn offers a ‘consequence 
model’ for each threat scenario, divided into six levels. From the ‘bottom up’ these comprise 
societal functions; property; economy; environment; health; and life. Hence, the fundaments 
entail societal functions rather than individual infrastructures. 
 
Finland never abandoned the Cold War total defence approach, but rather developed it 
further amid new conditions. Finland’s first CIP approach from 2006 was titled ‘The 
Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society’ [10], which reveals even more clearly 
than the Danish document that the approach focuses on vital societal functions rather than 
the infrastructures that support them. The main emphasis is on the functioning of society and 
government in all circumstances, not only protecting its individual critical infrastructures 
against extreme events.  
 
In a similar vein, the early Swedish model from 2007 was called ‘Critical Societal Functions’ 
[11]. The whole spirit of the Swedish approach was, like Finland’s, more about resilience 
than mere protection. However, the Swedish model differs from the Finnish one to some 
extent by putting much more emphasis on local rather than national government-level 
functions, reflecting the two countries’ somewhat different administrative systems and 
political culture.  
 
An important feature of the Swedish definition is that societal functions that are critical in 
emergencies can vary from situation to situation. It is not possible to list all of the functions 
that are critical for society in every situation, which is why it is important to analyze the 
specific societal functions that are critical in different situations. This approach is basically 
what the more analytical literature calls the consequence-oriented definition of criticality, 
whereby it is less the infrastructures themselves that are critical but more the criticality of 
the consequences of infrastructure failure [12]. 
 
In one sense, Norway’s early CIP system was a synthesis of many approaches. Like its 
Nordic neighbours, Norway also chose to speak about critical or vital societal functions 
rather than just critical infrastructure. In the Norwegian approach – called ‘Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures and Critical Societal Functions in Norway’ [13] – both the concept 
of infrastructure and that of function were included as elements at different levels. Critical 
societal functions formed a more general level, being dependent on but also encompassing 
infrastructures. The hierarchical idea was that society’s basic needs are covered by critical 
societal functions, which depend on infrastructures, whose criticality is assessed according 
to three criteria: dependability, in that a high degree of dependability implies criticality; 
alternatives, in that few or no alternatives imply criticality; and tight coupling, in that a high 
degree of tight coupling or linkage within a network implies criticality. This approach forms 
the basis for deciding whether any given infrastructure is critical or not. In practice, the 
approach makes it possible to limit the extent of the CI considerably, because not every part 
of, say, an electricity grid or a transport system is necessarily considered critical, which is 
the case in the EU approach at the conceptual level. 
 
In a 2017 report by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), titled ‘Vital 
functions in society. What functional capabilities must society maintain at all times?’ [14], 
the term ‘vital societal functions’ is defined and the functions are listed and categorized. The 
term is reserved for “functions that society could not cope without for seven days or less 
without this threatening the safety and/or security of the population”. The term is further 
divided into three broad categories: governability and sovereignty; security of the 
population; and societal functionality. Listed under these categories are the functional areas 
and assets that are usually brought up in critical infrastructure discussions, such as the 
government and other administrative bodies, the emergency services, essential utilities such 
as energy and water, and so forth. It is noteworthy that the very term ‘critical infrastructure’ 
is not mentioned at all, with the term ‘infrastructure-based services’ being used instead. 
 
3.2 Protection or resilience? 
 
When EPCIP, the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, was 
launched, the concept of resilience did not appear in policy documents. While the ‘Green 
Paper’ [15] that introduced EPCIP recognizes that not all infrastructures can be protected 
against all threats, its solution was to prioritize the protective measures in relation to 
each other and then to focus on selected protected objects. Similarly, the subsequent 
Council Directive on EPCIP [5] is characterized by the same approach and, consequently, 
by the absence of any reference to resilience.  
 
Although the concept of resilience has deep roots in many disciplines, in its 
contemporary meaning it may be appropriate to trace it back to the ecological debates of 
the early 1970s [16]. The concept was popularized in unofficial policy and scientific 
analyses in the mid-2000s in the context of crisis and disaster management. Before long, 
it also entered the academic field of critical infrastructure studies, replacing the earlier 
focus on protection [17, 18, 19]. After some years, this paradigm shift became visible at 
the policy level as well, first and foremost in the US [20]. As was the case with the 
concept of CIP, the EU followed the same trajectory after lagging behind for some years. 
In the 2012 Commission review of EPCIP [6], the concept of resilience already plays a 
role, albeit a small one. As an alternative concept to protection, resilience didn’t start to 
appear in the EC institutions in earnest until about 2014 [21].  
 
What then is the difference between protection and resilience? The Council Directive on 
EPCIP [5] defines protection as “all activities aimed at ensuring the functionality, continuity 
and integrity of critical infrastructures in order to deter, mitigate and neutralise a threat, risk 
or vulnerability”. On the other hand, no official EU definition has been suggested as yet that 
would be suitable for CI purposes in particular. However, a generic definition, also 
applicable to CI, is provided by the United Nation’s International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR) [22], namely: “The ability of a system, community or society exposed 
to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a 
timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions”. At national levels, however, several definitions of 
resilience exist [23], more or less following the UNISDR definition above. 
 
It is notable in the UNISDR definition that the verb ‘resist’ implies that protective measures 
are included. Resilience can thus be understood as an umbrella concept that also covers CIP. 
Hence, in our scheme it basically covers all the ‘phases’ of the traditional crisis management 
cycle. Resilience focuses on preventive, mitigative and preparedness activities before the 
crisis hits, as well as the response during the crisis. Most notably, it also deals with recovery 
after the crisis, in the event of the disruption of a CI service, for example. 
 
The exact boundaries of the resilience discourse in the context of CI are still rather 
blurred. Nevertheless, certain sub-discourses have emerged, and have even become 
institutionalized. Consequently, we can differentiate between at least three separate, 
albeit partially overlapping domains of CI resilience: societal, organizational, and 
technological. When defining the resilience domain, in principle we can approach the 
issue from the perspective of the organizations or institutions that are in charge of taking 
the appropriate actions before, during or after a harmful and unwanted event affecting 
CI service provision.  
 
In societal resilience, the important actors are national and local governments, 
communities and households, and it is in these contexts that critical infrastructure 
resilience often overlaps with normal civil protection or crisis management efforts. In 
organizational resilience, the actors are businesses, especially those responsible for 
critical infrastructures and supply chains. In technological resilience, the actors include 
critical infrastructure and the respective facility operators, and, to some extent, safety 
and security manufacturers and vendors [21, 24].  
 
As for the Nordic countries, resilience has implicitly been present from the very emergence 
of their CIP policies, precisely because they concentrated not only on sectoral 
infrastructures, but also on vital societal functions. However, even if resilience does happen 
to be the main term when discussing safety and security issues in the Nordic countries at 
present, it is only fairly recently that it has been applied and concretized into CI in particular. 
 
Denmark has a well-developed societal safety and security system, coupled with the 
respective research activities. However, when it comes to resilience or CI resilience, the 
subject is not yet well argued. The country’s vulnerability analyses from 2005 to 2010 [e.g. 
25, 26, 27] prepared by DEMA, the Danish Emergency Management Agency, hardly touch 
upon the concept of resilience, focusing instead on vulnerability as the inverse concept. 
Thus, the 2006 vulnerability analysis can be quoted as stating that “vulnerability (and its 
opposite, resilience) expresses a given system’s general ability to function and achieve its 
goals when faced with threats. A system is vulnerable when it lacks or has reduced capacity 
to plan for, prevent, respond to or recover from a realized threat. Vulnerability assessment 
is carried out comparing threats against existing capacities, as well as the preferred degree 
of protection”.   
 
In this approach, the concepts of vulnerability and resilience seem to be two sides of the 
same coin, effectively sharing the same definition, while resilience per se is not discussed 
separately. However, the term resilience is covered indirectly in that the official documents 
use words like robustness, vulnerability and recovery, which can be seen as key words or 
elements in the concept of resilience. The 2013 ‘National Risk Profile’ [8], for instance, 
mentions in the introduction that society must be robust and prepared for accidents and 
disasters. In the latest 2017 National Risk Profile [9], resilience is not mentioned at all, but 
the analysis model is based on an application of the typical crisis management cycle with its 
pre-, during, and post-crisis phases, and can thus be seen as essentially including all the 
elements of resilience. However, the main focus is perhaps on protection (or the prevention, 
preparedness and respond phases) rather than on resilience in terms of rapid recovery. The 
DEMA report from 2015 on the country’s crisis management system [28], for instance, states 
that the purpose is “to ensure a robust society by developing and strengthening preparedness, 
in order to prevent and respond to major accidents and disasters”. 
  
Similarly, in the case of Finland, the concept of resilience has only recently progressed from 
academic discussion into official policy documents. In Finland’s 2016 ‘National Risk 
Assessment’ [29], the concept, in its translated form, already plays a rather prominent role. The 
Finnish-language equivalent, which could perhaps be expressed as ‘crisis withstandness’,   
emphasizes rather clearly that although it is not possible to prevent every crisis, one still has to 
build up resilience to persevere and recover from the materialized crisis quickly. The concept 
of crisis resilience is even included in the Government’s 2016 ‘Foreign and Security Policy 
Report’[30], reflecting its connection with the traditional total defence concept. 
 
In Norway, too, resilience as such is a rather new concept, especially when it comes to CI, even 
if it might have been implicitly present earlier. Viewed more holistically, after the major 
terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya Island on July 22, 2011, the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security released a report to the Norwegian Parliament concerning public security, approved 
by the State Council [31]. The concept of resilience does not appear in the report, however. Nor 
does the Royal Decree of 2012 [32], which focuses on the same subject, use that term. However, 
both reports mention CI. The Royal Decree stresses that the departments are to evaluate risks, 
vulnerability and robustness vis-à-vis critical infrastructure within their own sector, on the basis 
of the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) national risk analysis. Further, the 
resolution states that different departments should consider carrying out preventive and 
preparedness-related measures to strengthen the robustness of critical infrastructure and 
important societal functions. Even more attuned to the spirit of resilience, the evaluation should 
include the ability to maintain or recover important societal functions under the strain that an 
unwanted event would entail. In sum, all the key elements of CI resilience can be found in this 
document, yet without using the concept of resilience itself as an explicit umbrella term. 
 
The ‘National Risk Analysis’, prepared by the DSB in 2013 and updated in 2014 [33, 34], 
already takes the concept of resilience on board, although basically only its societal domain, to 
the exclusion of the organizational or technological domains. It states that “resilient societies” 
is a relatively new concept in civil protection. However, the report emphasizes that the concept 
is becoming increasingly important, stressing that due to the complex relationships and mutual 
interdependencies in society, resilience may become of even greater strategic importance in the 
future in terms of efforts to strengthen civil protection. As a source of conceptual inspiration, 
the report refers to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 2013 [35] as a strategy for 
continuously identifying new hazards and threats through risk analyses and the preparation of 
plans to meet these risks. This is said to be a strategy for confronting events of which we have 
little knowledge and no prior intelligence of their probability or consequences. The DSB report 
goes on to state, using the definition by Norris et al. [36], that resilient societies are 
characterized by being able to adapt to changing conditions during and after extraordinary stress 
and strain. “The properties that characterize resilient societies are robustness, redundancy and 
the ability to respond rapidly.” In the concluding remarks, the report highlights that the less that 
is known and the greater the uncertainty about a type of risk, the more obvious resilience 
becomes as a strategy.  
 
Sweden was definitely one of the first countries to make the societal safety and security 
approach more about resilience than mere protection [37]. In 2011, commissioned by the 
Swedish Government, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) published a national 
strategy for the protection of important public services [38]. In the introduction, it states that 
the purpose of the strategy is to develop a more resilient society. In that context, resilience is 
defined as “the capacity the society has to withstand and recover from a disruption”. In 2013, 
MSB published a report [39] under the title ‘Resilience – the concept’s different meanings and 
utilization areas’. The report states that its mission is to contribute knowledge about how the 
term resilience is used across different sectors, rather than suggesting how and where MSB 
should use the term. Hence, the report provides a number of different definitions from different 
organizations. Furthermore, it stresses that the term resilience will be subject to further 
development and that MSB will follow this development. MSB has also decided on a research 
strategy for 2014 to 2018. The strategy includes, among other things, the goals of protecting 
important public services, analyzing risk and vulnerability, and enhancing resilience [40]. In 
2015, MSB contributed considerable funding to the establishment of the Centre for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Research (CenCIP), based in Lund University. While the endeavour 
failed to emphasize resilience over protection, the practical research is nonetheless largely about 
the former. 
 
3.3 A terrorism or all-hazards approach? 
 
In the early phases of the CIP debates, especially in the US, the focus was predominantly 
on terrorism-related threats [41, 42]. This was the case even prior to 9/11. For instance, the 
US presidential report in 1997 stated that “While poor design, accidents and natural 
disasters may threaten our infrastructures, we focused primarily on hostile attempts to 
damage, misuse, or otherwise subvert them” [41]. Naturally, the emphasis on deliberate 
attacks was hugely reinforced after 9/11. The idea that western states “face a determined, 
intelligent enemy who seeks to cause us maximum harm”, and that the focus should 
therefore be on worst-case analysis [43], became prevalent in the US. This approach was 
largely copied by the EU. Terrorist attacks, especially the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 
bombings, were actually the catalyst for launching the EPCIP in the first place. The 
terrorism-as-threat-scenario approach was to some extent mirrored in institutionalized 
solutions. In the EU, for instance, the EPCIP came to be coordinated by the Directorate 
General that was responsible for police affairs, rather than the directorate responsible for 
civil protection. Moreover, NATO’s CIP focus was originally on “ways to assist nations in 
improving their preparedness for the protection of civilian populations from terrorist attacks 
against critical infrastructure” [42]. 
 
The partial revival of the all-hazards approach in the US CI strategy, while retaining 
terrorism as the main threat, only came about after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which shifted 
the focus away from the one-sided emphasis on terrorism somewhat [44]. The EU approach 
similarly ended up balancing between terrorism and an all-hazards approach. However, in 
November 2005 when the Commission published the ‘Green Paper’ [15] that was to be 
discussed by stakeholders in the member states, it gave three options concerning the threats: 
an all-hazards approach for everything; an all-hazards approach that prioritized terrorism; 
and a terrorism hazards approach. If one then looks at the Commission’s Directive Proposal 
of December 2006, a terrorism-as-priority approach was adopted, although reference was 
also made to the concept of ‘threat’ defined as “any indication, circumstance, or event with 
the potential to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, or any element thereof” [45]. The 
European Parliament wanted to add their amendments that “structurally determined threats 
should also be covered” but the “threat of terrorism should, however, be given priority” 
[46]. The final Council Directive refers to an earlier Justice and Home Affairs Council call 
from December 2005 for the Commission to prepare the EPCIP under an approach, where 
“man-made, technological threats and natural disasters should be taken into account in the 
critical infrastructure protection process, but the threat of terrorism should be given 
priority” [5].  
 
This approach was obviously at odds with the traditional all-hazards approach of the Nordic 
countries – even if they also took, and continue to take, terrorism and other malicious threats 
against CI seriously.  
 
All of the Nordic countries have prepared national risk assessments in recent years – in some 
cases even several – based on an all-hazards approach. This has been largely, and paradoxically, 
inspired by the EU, but more recently by those parts of the EC that deal with civil protection 
rather than CI or police matters. Indeed, there are a considerable number of EU policies 
contributing to disaster risk management in the all-hazards spirit [47]. One of the most 
informative in the current context is the Commission document ‘Overview of Natural and Man-
made Disaster Risks in the EU’, the first version of which was published in April 2014 [48]. 
The document is a summary analysis of the national risk assessments of (at that time) 18 
member states and associated countries, prepared by following a joint risk assessment 
methodology provided by the Commission [49], which in turn was based on the ISO 31000 
standard [50].  
 
The April 2014 [48] document starts from the assumption that information provided by national 
authorities is sufficient for drawing general conclusions about “the most important disaster risks 
that a large number of Member States are addressing, focusing in particular on risks with a 
cross-border dimension”. The guidelines set by the Commission [49], in turn, state that member 
states should consider all significant natural and man-made hazards that could occur “on 
average once or more every 100 years (i.e. annual probability of 1% or more) and for which the 
consequences represent significant potential impacts, i.e. number of affected people greater than 
50, economic and environmental costs above €100 million, and political/social impact 
considered significant or very serious”. 
 
On the basis of the 18 national risk assessments, the document identifies the twelve most 
addressed hazards as follows: (Natural hazards:) Floods, Severe weather, Wild/Forest fires, 
Earthquakes, Pandemics/epidemics, Livestock epidemics; (Man-made hazards:) Industrial 
accidents, Nuclear/radiological accidents; Transport accidents; Loss of critical infrastructure; 
Cyber attacks; and Terrorist attacks. In one section, the document also discusses emerging risks. 
These include climate change-related hazards (including migration), space-related hazards 
(space debris, space weather, near-Earth objects), and anti-microbial resistance. 
 
While all of the above hazards could easily trigger critical infrastructure service disruptions, it 
is worth noting that the loss of CI is also listed as a separate category. The corresponding section 
in the document emphasizes the interconnected nature of CI systems, especially energy 
networks, which rapidly cascade from one country to another. The following countries 
expressed particular concern about CI losses in their national risk assessments: the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
 
Of the Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are represented in the above-
mentioned EU risk assessment summary. Finland subsequently prepared its first national risk 
assessment in 2016, and Denmark, Norway and Sweden have since updated theirs. Currently, 
the EU requires each member state to update its risk assessment every three years.   
 
In 2013, the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) published its first ‘National 
Risk Profile’ [8], although it had previously produced so-called vulnerability reports on a 
regular basis [25, 26, 27] (like the other Nordic countries under different labels). The 2013 
report classifies incidents according to whether they are man-made or natural, where natural 
incidents are divided into extreme weather phenomena and serious contagious diseases, and 
man-made incidents into two sub-categories: accidents and security threats. DEMA selected ten 
incident types for further investigation: hurricanes, strong storm and storm surges, heavy rain 
and cloudburst, pandemic influenza, animal diseases and zoonoses, transport accidents, 
accidents involving dangerous substances on land, marine pollution accidents, nuclear 
accidents, terrorist acts, and cyber-attacks. 
 
The latest ‘National Risk Profile’ from January 2017 [9] in turn divides the risks into event 
types and tendencies. While all of the above-mentioned risks are mentioned, water and food-
borne diseases as well as space weather have been added. Moreover, the tendencies include 
security policy tensions, antibiotic resistance, irregular migration, and increased activity in the 
Arctic. 
 
In a separate Danish ‘Security Intelligence Risk Assessment’ from 2015 [51], the report refers 
to two sources in terms of the threat landscape: Russia, which “has access to cyber capabilities 
suited to bolster the country’s conventional military operations, such as targeted operations 
against critical infrastructure”, as well as “non-state actors, including ISIL”, who engage in 
cyber efforts to hack critical components, resulting in a system breakdown.  
 
The Finnish ‘National Risk Assessment’ [29] was published in late 2016. On the basis of the 
assessment of over 60 risks, 21 possible event scenarios for Finland were selected for in-depth 
discussion. The risks are categorized into two types, namely wide-ranging events affecting 
society (6 risks) and serious regional events (15 risks). Cyber risks are discussed in some detail 
under the first category, differentiating between utilizing the cyber domain to paralyze systems 
vital to society, risks associated with cybercrime, and data security risks in digitalization. This 
category includes, in addition to the typical nuclear accident risk, a 100-year risk scenario for a 
solar storm, in line with Norway and Sweden and some other European countries. Most natural 
disaster risks are considered serious regional events, together with terrorist attacks targeted 
against Finland. The timing of the Finnish risk assessment also explains why a mass influx of 
migrants is included as a national risk, unlike the European risk assessments that were prepared 
two or three years earlier.  
 
Norway has been a part of EU risk assessment efforts, but it had already been active in this field 
before, independently of the EU coordination. According to the Royal Decree of 24 June 2005, 
the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection was ordered to prepare a vulnerability and 
preparedness report that would serve as the baseline for further safety and preparedness 
investigations across sectors and departments [52]. The aforementioned reports have been 
prepared from 2012 onwards under the name ‘National Risk Analysis’ [33, 34].  
 
Norway’s 2014 ‘National Risk Analysis’ [34] divides hazards into natural events, major 
accidents and malicious events, where each category is further divided into risk areas with 
associated scenarios. The six most probable scenarios are all natural events, including extreme 
weather, forest fires, epidemics, avalanches, and space weather.  The risk areas that have the 
greatest consequences for society, overlapping with the aforementioned, are security policy 
crises, earthquakes, extreme weather, nuclear accidents, epidemics, cyberspace, and 
avalanches. The scenarios with the highest risks are then carefully evaluated, and are related to 
epidemics, earthquakes, nuclear accidents, extreme weather and avalanches. As is apparent, 
natural events are considered not only more likely but also more risky than man-made malicious 
risks. A terrorist threat in a big city is one of the scenarios discussed in the report, however. It 
is mentioned that the threat of terrorism against Norway is regarded as heightened, possibly 
including the capacity to use chemical, biological, and radiological substances, as well as 
nuclear material. 
 
In 2011, the Swedish MSB began work on its national risk assessment, as commissioned by the 
government. In the ‘National Risk Assessment’ published the following year [53], MSB 
“identified 27 particularly serious national events, which were derived from the more than 200 
events identified in the agencies’ risk and vulnerability analyses of 2010–2011”. The report 
states, however, that MSB does not consider the 27 scenarios analyzed to represent the greatest 
risks facing Sweden as a country. Instead, they should be viewed as in-depth studies of a 
selection of events that were considered to be particularly serious in the risk identification 
phase. Among the 27 events were incidents such as disruption of the fuel, food and electricity 
supply, the flooding of water sources, a contaminated drinking water supply, heatwaves, 
pandemics, landslides, storms, and so on. Added to this, eleven scenarios were developed, while 
seven were analyzed and assessed.  Of these events, a school shooting and a prolonged heatwave 
were deemed the most likely to occur. A major fire on a cruise ship, disruption of the food 
supply due to fuel shortages, and the failure of a large dam on a river were evaluated to have 
the greatest impact. The events entailing the greatest overall risk in terms of a combination of 
likelihood and severity were a fuel shortage leading to a disrupted food supply, the failure of a 
large dam on a river, and a prolonged heatwave. 
 
In 2016, MSB published an updated version of the national risk assessment [54]. This already 
comprises a rather comprehensive collection of risk assessments, together with a capability 
assessment. The risks are categorized into four main groups: natural hazards (10 different risks), 
major accidents (4), disruption to technical infrastructure and supply systems (7), and 
antagonistic hazards (4). The third category plainly concerns critical infrastructure, and includes 
the following categories: disruptions to the energy supply; disruption to electronic 
communications; disruption to the payment system; disruption to the food supply; disruption to 
the drinking water supply; disruptions to the transport system; and disruption to the supply of 
drugs. Cyber-attacks and terrorism are listed under antagonistic hazards. Resilience is 
mentioned only in passing in this document, noting that critical infrastructure should be made 
robust and resilient in order to avoid severe cascading effects. 
 
3.4 National or macro-regional resilience? 
 
It is clear that the ability to identify and analyze interdependencies is an important part of CI 
resilience. Although interdependencies are a common feature of critical infrastructure systems, 
often materialized via cyber connections through information and communication technology, 
many of them are regionally determined in that they are closely related to geographical 
proximity, geographical functionality, and integrated regional networks. This is particularly 
true in the Baltic Sea Region and especially in the Nordic countries, where critical 
infrastructures are in many sectors part of the very same Nordic infrastructure system. This 
concerns highly physical infrastructure such as electricity grids, as well as less physical 
infrastructure such as financial and banking services. It is useful, therefore, to take into account 
the particular regional cross-border effects of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities as well as the 
specific features of European sub-regions [37], more often referred to as macro-regions in EU 
parlance today.  
 
Contrary to expectations, the EU framework, namely the EPCIP Directive of 2008 [5], has 
proved ineffective as a means of enhancing cross-border or macro-regional cooperation. In 
practice, that part of the CI within two sectors – energy and transport – that is designated as 
European critical infrastructure (ECI) has to be nominated by a member state, and its identity 
remains undisclosed. Very few member states have exercised this right as they do not wish to 
be regulated. Among those who have, some close-to-border CI, such as power stations or grids 
that provide services across borders have been nominated. According to the EPCIP Directive 
[5], this entails producing a preparedness plan in line with a specific EC template. As these 
infrastructures are not only rather randomly selected or nominated, but also remain undisclosed 
as a rule, even within the EC, the visible impact of the EPCIP is very low. What remains is for 
the EC to provide some kind of support for national CI.    
 
The Nordic countries are known for their close cooperation, however, which is traditionally 
deeper and has a longer pedigree than EU cooperation. The main fora for this have been the 
Nordic institutions, particularly the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), which coordinates 
intergovernmental cooperation between the countries. In the field of safety and security, this 
cooperation focuses on civil protection rather than critical infrastructure or its resilience, but  
these fields naturally overlap. The first Nordic framework agreement in the field of rescue 
cooperation dates back to 1989 between Denmark and Norway; Finland and Sweden joined in 
1992, and Iceland in 2001. This cooperation, encompassing highly practical and operative 
cross-border arrangements, is called NORDRED. Since 2005, civil protection has been 
included at a wider and higher level within NCM’s cooperation areas. In practice, this entails 
high-level ministerial or Director General-level meetings twice a year with some preparatory 
committees. At this level, the result may be a common statement, like the Haga Declaration 
from 2009 and the Haga II Declaration from 2013, issued by the Nordic ministers for civil 
protection, which called for the Nordic countries to adopt the same strategic approach across 
borders in the Nordic region. This high-level mandate in turn has provided the impetus for   
regular, rotating crisis decision-making workshops and training, as well as projects focusing on 
cross-border crisis-management issues.  
 
A major project in this context revealed that rather widespread bottom-up, albeit fragmented, 
cooperation already existed, even at the regulatory level; the project detected 76 cross-border 
rescue cooperation agreements within the Nordic area. One of the challenges has consequently 
been to enhance the coordination of this cooperation in order to gain a holistic picture of its 
features [55]. At a more concrete level, several full-scale exercises are held on a rather regular 
basis with the participation of all or most of the Nordic countries in order to enhance 
interoperability, often organized within the EU Civil Protection context and with the assistance 
of respective funding.  
 
Another cooperation forum is the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which includes all 
of the Nordic countries plus the three Baltic States, Germany, Poland and Russia, as well as the 
European Commission, represented by the European External Action Service (EEAS).  Civil 
protection cooperation in terms of Director General meetings, civil servant cooperation and 
macro-regional projects has existed since the early 2000s, the latter often with EC funding. This 
cooperation intensified after the adoption of the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region (EUSBSR) by the European Council in 2009. This is the first macro-regional strategy 
in Europe, and it is organized into several policy areas (PA), one of which is EUBSR PA Secure, 
including both civil protection as well as law enforcement cooperation. This cooperation is 
coordinated by the CBSS and the Swedish MSB. While the EUSBSR as such is based on 
existing funding, it greatly facilitates the macro-regional cooperation on safety and security. 
Several past, current and planned projects in this context focus on risk assessment and risk 
management, gap and capacity analysis, and on enhancing resilience [56, 57]. 
 
3.5 Regulation or public-private partnership? 
 
 
So where do private actors fit into the picture? This is an important question when it comes 
to CI in particular. Governments are usually legally responsible for safeguarding CI, and 
yet most of it is owned, administered and operated by the private sector. This is why public-
private partnership (PPP) is regarded as a major issue in safeguarding national infrastructure 
[58]. While in the US private industry traditionally owns most of what is defined as national 
infrastructure, its share being estimated at 85 per cent, in many European countries 
infrastructures such as water, energy, and railway transportation have previously been the 
sole remit of the government. However, ever since the 1980s, these infrastructures have 
been undergoing a process of market liberalization and privatization. The rapid development 
of the predominantly privately owned and operated information and communication 
technology (ICT) sector, and other sectors’ dependence on it, has complicated the situation. 
This, coupled with other critical infrastructure interdependencies, has led to a rather 
ambiguous situation in terms of the real authority, as government authorities may have, 
either formally or informally, overall responsibility for the reliable provision of services, 
but they lack the authority, resources and skills to actually fulfil that responsibility [18]. 
Hence, private industry is supposed to be able to exert extensive self-regulation because, in 
practice, only they have access to the necessary technical capabilities and information 
pertaining to most of the CI.  
 
Added to this, globalization, with its tendency to move private companies outside the nation 
state, has made the situation more complex from the perspective of government control. The 
fact that national CI are dependent not only on other sectors but on the situation in other 
countries complicates the situation because no single country is either immune to the effects, 
or able to predict the outcomes, if its neighbours suffer from serious infrastructure 
disruptions [59]. 
 
Here we face the dilemma of the common good. Some have proposed that the solution lies 
in the concept and practice of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): “The link between 
CSR and critical infrastructure resilience is a compelling argument to understand and 
advance the social role for corporations in business” [60]. However, while CSR and PPP 
may seem self-evident and are celebrated by all parties, this shallow consensus is usually 
broken when it becomes clear that governments expect the private sector to make 
considerable investments beyond their cost-benefit calculations. Thus this dilemma leaves 
governments with only two options: to provide the necessary resources itself, funded out of 
the public budget, or to increase regulation [18].  
 
In the US, the approach is clearly based on voluntary private sector cooperation with the 
federal government. This is largely due to the country’s anti-regulation traditions, and the 
private sector’s willingness to do their share precisely in order to avoid regulation. 
Compared with the US, the EU approach, referring to national rather than EU legislation, 
seems to mark a step towards regulative efforts instead of mere voluntary compliance, 
although both the US and the EU put emphasis on the importance of PPP [21]. 
 
None of the Nordic countries has thus far arrived at any clear solution to this dilemma. 
Undeniably, CI operators usually do prepare all kinds of regulatory and voluntary risk 
assessments, but the regulation is rather light, and often outdated. In Finland’s ‘National 
Risk Assessment’ this issue is highlighted in the case of cyber threats in particular. It states 
that critical infrastructure in Finland is for the most part owned by the private sector and 
companies tend to follow commercial logic, “which creates a challenge for cyber security 
preparedness”. The report also states that legislation “does not take a uniform approach to 
cyber threats. Rather, legislation in this field is sector-specific. It is also a challenge to 
discern between an attack against an individual actor – a crime – and an act against the 
state”. Furthermore, the report concludes that “whereas cyber threats carried out by states 
are typically cross-border threats, the powers of national authorities only apply inside their 
sovereign borders” [29]. 
 
There is, of course, rather detailed regulation in all countries related in particular to so-
called high-risk industries, such as nuclear power plants, as well as organizations connected 
to critical public services, such as hospitals. They should have updated risk assessments as 
well as the respective capacities and capabilities, which are monitored in principle by 
certain independent state or municipal agencies. In many privately-owned CI cases, 
however, this regulation is also rather vague from the perspective of resilience.  
 
Adding regulation would force the private sector to invest more resources in dealing with 
the protection or resilience of the systems they own or operate. This would be an unwelcome 
change for many CI operators because markets are externalizing CI risks at present, whereas 
state regulation would mean establishing “liability rules based on the notion that 
organizations should internalize the costs of the risks they produce and that by internalizing 
them, they will make wiser choices about the technologies they use” [12]. This in essence 
would necessitate a well-functioning tort liability legislation, which would make it easy for 
consumers, both public and private, to subsequently demand compensation for losses 
incurred by critical infrastructure failures, which in turn would force industry to pay more 
pre-emptive attention to security and protection out of self-interest. 
 
In terms of the classification of resilience into societal, organizational and technological 
domains, one can say that while the first is largely covered by the actions of national and local 
authorities, or even partially by communities and households, the two latter domains are the 
responsibility of the CI operators. At least in the literature, it is possible to identify a normative 
tendency to recommend moving from typical risk management towards resilience management. 
This is motivated by the fact that risk assessment, being a part of risk management, reveals only 
the preventive, mitigating and preparedness efforts that are needed to treat risks before a crisis, 
whereas resilience management also covers the during-the-crisis and after-the-crisis phases. In 
this sense, resilience management would be close to what is usually understood as crisis 
management – or the crisis management cycle [61].  
 
But how should resilience management be carried out? While in the field of risk management 
one can find more or less popular and authorized standard frameworks, most notably the ISO 
31000 standard [34], there are no standards when it comes to performing resilience 
management. How do we know whether a CI is resilient or not? Can resilience be measured? 
How can it be enhanced? In fact, a number of models do exist, some of which are only 
theoretical applications while others are already in operational use [24, 63, 64], and designed 
for CI resilience assessment. No such models are in operative use in Europe, however. In order 
to pave the way for more structured resilience assessment, the EC is currently financing around 
six projects in its Horizon 2020 programme, which, taken together, are designed to contribute 
to forthcoming European guidelines for resilience, focusing largely on CI resilience. The Nordic 
countries, through research institutions but also in association with civil protection authorities 
as well as CI operators to some extent, are well represented in these projects, which may 
eventually contribute to CI resilience in such a way as to become firmly established in these 
countries in more practical terms. 
 
4. Discussion  
 
So what can we glean from the concise review above? Is there a specific Nordic model, and is 
it one that other countries could learn from?  
 
We have reviewed this issue mainly at the conceptual level, focusing on five issue areas that 
were formulated as dichotomies. The first issue considered the level of analysis. Should one 
focus on CI or on vital or critical societal functions instead? From a comparative perspective, 
the Nordic countries analyzed here, namely Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, have fairly 
similar conceptions concerning critical infrastructure. They all proceed from a more 
fundamental level of vital societal functions, which in turn are provided by CI. This is clearly 
a more inter-sectoral approach compared to the original EPCIP, and closer to the concept of 
resilience, even if that concept was not yet fashionable when the Nordic approaches were 
formulated. One can argue that the tradition of the Cold War total defence concept – currently 
enjoying a revival in the Nordic countries – influenced this more holistic view, at least in 
Finland and Sweden. The EC, in turn, seems to have been favourably disposed towards this 
approach, which could well be formulated as a ‘Nordic model’. 
 
The second issue was related to how the resilience concept is handled in the Nordic countries’ 
policies. Arguably, the concept of CI resilience has not completely replaced CIP in the Nordic 
countries, and the debate and conceptual development vis-à-vis resilience mainly focus on 
society as a whole, rather than on CI, where the emphasis still seems to be on typical risk 
assessment and risk treatment approaches in terms of preventive and protective measures. 
However, one can see that the traditions of focusing on vital societal functions and the general 
attitudes towards safety and security support the development of more detailed and concrete 
resilience policies and programmes in the near future. At the present time in these countries, 
one can hardly participate in safety and security debates without bringing up the concept of 
resilience.  
 
The third issue considered the threat scenarios – whether one should focus on terrorism when 
it comes to CI, or whether one should adopt an all-hazards approach. The original EPCIP 
approach clearly emphasized the terrorist threat against CI, somewhat undermining other 
threats. This might still be the case, and the focus could perhaps be more decidedly on ECBRN 
(explosive, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) threats, rather than all-hazards when 
it comes to CI.   
 
However, the general EU civil protection approach is clearly an all-hazards one. The national 
risk assessments of the Nordic countries, following the EC guidelines, were prepared in this 
spirit. In this field, coordinated by the EC bodies responsible for civil protection rather than CI, 
all-hazards is the norm. Admittedly, the risk assessments of the respective countries were not 
prepared simultaneously, let alone in concert, and in spite of the common methodological 
guidelines provided by the EC [33], the methodologies vary from country to country. However, 
one can still conclude that the Nordic risk assessments basically identified the same risks. All 
of the countries rely heavily on an all-hazards approach, and terrorism is not accentuated more 
than cyber risks, extreme weather, or floods, for instance. This comes as no surprise, given the 
similar circumstances of the four countries.  
 
One can also refer to the recent Finnish and Swedish assessments in particular, where one can 
identify a trend of progressing from mere risk assessment towards outlining risk treatment 
options as well, which would be the logical next step according to the ISO 31000 standard [34]. 
However, both risk assessments fail to venture very far in this direction. Indeed, they just 
routinely describe existing actions or institutions vis-à-vis risks (Finland) or capabilities 
(Sweden) that are already in place, rather than paying systematic attention to a range of generic 
risk treatment options for each identified risk, in accordance with the ISO 31000 standard. 
 
The fourth issue concerned national approaches versus macro-regional cooperation. While both 
civil protection and CI remain under the national authority, one can conclude that the macro-
regional dimension of cooperation between the Nordic countries, and more widely within the 
Baltic Sea Region, is producing tangible results in terms of harmonizing or approximating 
vocabulary and approaches, adopting good practices, organizing exercises, and creating – 
within the Nordic countries in particular – a legal and regulatory framework for civil protection 
cooperation. The NCM and the CBSS are crucial facilitators of this cooperation. Nevertheless, 
it would be difficult to imagine this activity without strong EU support, especially where 
funding and the supporting framework of the EUSBSR are concerned. While CI resilience is 
not directly addressed in terms of close cooperation with CI operators, the societal dimension 
of resilience is, and includes both national competent authorities as well as regional and local 
actors.   
 
The last issue discussed the problem of how to organize CI resilience efforts, considering that 
most of the CI is, in fact, owned and operated by profit-making private actors. Should it be 
handled through regulation or public-private partnership? It can be concluded that the Nordic 
countries do not have any specific model or solution for this puzzle. Regulation is clearly 
fragmented and non-coordinated vis-à-vis the so-called new threats in particular, such as cyber 
security. The cooperation between state authorities and private CI operators is, however, 
facilitated by dint of the fact that in small countries people in the same field, both civil servants, 
politicians, private company actors and researchers, tend to know each other and meet regularly 
in seminars, workshops and committees.  
 
On the other hand, if we look at Nordic CI operators from the perspective of whether they carry 
out resilience assessments, any random survey reveals that the vast majority is actually 
performing risk assessment and management, but hardly anyone uses the term resilience, let 
alone speaks about applying any structured methodology to assess or test it. It seems that the 
impetus in this field should come from the EC. If some kind of guidelines for CI resilience 
assessment could be agreed upon at the EU level, this would probably make the concept more 
widespread for operative use, not only in the Nordic countries but also in Europe at large. 
 
That said, the conceptual review presented above does not paint the whole picture. First, it 
arguably takes too homogenous a view of the situation. While the approaches look similar, there 
are some crucial differences in the countries’ civil protection and crisis management systems at 
the administrative level, reflecting their general political-administrative systems that vary in 
many respects [64, 65]. Second, a conceptual analysis does not say much about practice. While 
any country obviously handles crises with varying degrees of success, it is difficult to test the 
existence of a resilient system from a comparative perspective. Some crisis management 
studies, however, do suggest that there are differences in practice in the way that the Nordic 
countries have managed the same crisis situation [66].  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
It is clear that the concept of CI resilience (perhaps to be called CIR in the future) is gradually 
replacing the original CIP, with the latter focusing on protective measures and resilience as 
opposed to focusing on the whole cycle of a crisis, emphasizing the impossibility of 
safeguarding against all threats. The current analysis has discussed the puzzle of whether there 
is any specific Nordic model with regard to CI resilience in particular, taking the wider issues 
of civil protection on board as well. The comparative perspective has been applied at many 
levels: across time, between the EU approach and the Nordic approaches, and between the 
Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The puzzle was also scrutinized 
in more detail through five issue areas or crucial ‘test questions’, reviewed in section 3 and 
briefly discussed in section 4. The results of this investigation are summarized in Table 2.  
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Looking at Table 2, it seems that a Nordic model of some description does exist, or is at least 
‘in the making’ when it comes to approaches towards CI resilience, or in any case the conceptual 
development and basic philosophy appear to be rather similar, taking into account the obvious 
idiosyncrasies. Even from an early stage, the Nordic countries’ approaches have been more 
holistic than those of the EC, focusing on vital societal functions rather than mere sector-based 
infrastructures. In the current study of resilience, these countries do not seem to experience any 
difficulty in moving from CIP to a more resilience-based paradigm. Moreover, they all clearly 
rely on an all-hazards approach, refraining from putting undue emphasis on the terrorist threat 
scenario. They are not only engaged in cooperation within the EU, but they have also adopted 
an institutionalized approach towards cross-border cooperation within the Nordic and Baltic 
Sea countries.  
 
However, if one accepts the division of resilience into societal, organizational and technological 
domains, this Nordic approach is more visible in the societal resilience domain, where the 
national and local authorities are the key players. When it comes to CI operators, the concept 
of resilience is still rather abstract and lacks concrete operationalization. So, one can argue that 
the interplay between the authorities and CI operators, be it discussed in terms of regulation, 
state support, public-private partnership or corporate social responsibility, remains the weak 
link in achieving CI resilience in practice.  
 
The review of the Nordic countries’ conceptual approaches towards CI-related crises 
nevertheless gives the impression that these countries are rather ‘progressive’ and have always 
had a broader and more holistic philosophy than the one originally offered by the EC, based on 
prioritizing the protection of CI against terrorism. However, this argument can be tempered to 
a considerable extent by noting that there has been a fruitful interplay at the conceptual level 
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